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TREVOR GRIFFITHS 
Quantifying an “Essential Social Habit”:  
The Entertainments Tax and Cinemagoing 
in Britain, 1916–1934
ABSTRACT: This paper reconstructs levels of cinemagoing in Britain over the two decades 
preceding the first accepted estimates of the national audience, which were produced in 
1934. It uses the receipts from the tax on entertainments, levied by British governments 
starting in 1916, to examine the impact of broader developments, from war to major eco-
nomic downturns, and radical changes within the industry itself with the introduction of 
sound technology. A significant discontinuity is identified in the emergence of the talking 
picture, which worked to broaden and deepen support for the cinema, confirming it as 
the dominant mass entertainment form of the period. 
KEYWORDS: audiences, cinema exhibitors, taxation, prices of admission, war, recession
INTRODUCTION 
Cinema’s dominance of commercial entertainment across Britain by the 
mid-1930s is well documented. An audience of 903 million in 1934, equivalent 
to a weekly attendance of 17.4 million, accounted for just under two-thirds 
(66.32 percent) of all expenditure on taxable amusements, a position that would 
only be strengthened further during the ensuing decade, when cinema’s share 
of attendance and expenditure rose to 83 and 74 percent, respectively.1 Starting 
with figures from the mid-1930s, the study of cinema attendance rests on secure 
statistical foundations. However, prior to the mid-1930s, a period that encom-
passed total war, two major recessions, and the technological upheaval occa-
sioned by the advent of talking pictures, the position regarding attendance is 
altogether less clear. The few estimates that are available derive from occasional 
contemporary observations on attendance, most of which lacked supporting 
evidence and were often advanced to justify claims of the industry’s size and 
importance. As a result, figures often markedly at variance could circulate 
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almost simultaneously. In the early 1920s, estimates of the weekly audience as 
divergent as 7.5 million and 40 million were aired.2 In 1916–17, both A. H. Spoor 
of the Essanay Film Service and F. R. Goodwin of the Cinematograph Exhibitors’ 
Association (CEA) argued for an average daily attendance across all 4,500 ven-
ues then screening moving pictures of between 3.4 and 3.6 million, generating 
audiences of over 20 million a week and in excess of 1 billion during the year.3 
Carrying as they did the imprimatur of leading industry figures, such numbers 
gained broad acceptance in the trade and were presented as commonsense 
alternatives to more extreme claims.4 Among those citing attendance in excess 
of 20 million per week was the individual responsible for the first attempt to 
systematically measure attendance levels in the 1930s, Simon Rowson of the 
Gaumont British Picture Corporation.5 
Rowson’s initial inquiries were primarily intended to calculate amounts 
raised each year at cinema box offices in order to establish the proportion of 
proceeds from ticket sales that remained in Britain rather than leaking abroad 
to fill the coffers of film producers in Hollywood. Estimates of audience size 
were a by-product of this investigation. Rowson’s initial findings, which sug-
gested a weekly audience across Britain in 1933 of 18.5 million, were “a little 
less than was generally accepted as the number of admissions a few years ago” 
but did nothing to contradict the view that little “if any actual or appreciable 
change has really occurred in the last few years.”6 As those years beginning in 
1929 encompassed both a marked economic downturn and the most dramatic 
technological development since the advent of moving pictures themselves, 
this seems unlikely. Accepting both Rowson’s estimates of the 1930s and Spoor 
and Goodwin’s figures for 1916–17 has implications for understanding change 
across the period, as it would suggest that support for silent film exceeded that 
for the talkies, at least until the surge in attendance created by conditions of 
war and austerity during the 1940s. A narrative emerges in which cinema was 
the beneficiary of successive wartime bubbles, with the period between the 
wars being marked by persistently lower levels of support.7 This paper is in part 
directed at evaluating this view.
Doubts about the calculations of Spoor and Goodwin can be raised. 
An examination of patterns of opening among the 550 cinemas active across 
Scotland in the months following the armistice indicates a large minority oper-
ating fewer than two shows nightly throughout the six-day week, with a number 
offering shows on selected nights only. When considered alongside evidence of 
seasonal opening patterns, with many houses opting to close during the period 
of slack business that began in the late spring, claims of an average attendance 
of 750 to 800 a night across all venues in 1916–17 appear open to question.8 If 
such reflections encourage skepticism about existing estimates, they do little to 
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offer viable alternatives. yet the means to do so are provided by the very series 
employed by Rowson to generate his estimates: the annual return of amounts 
raised by the entertainments tax. levied on the price of admission to “any 
entertainment, exhibition, performance, games and sport, to which or to view 
which, persons are admitted on payment,” the tax was introduced in the budget 
of April 1916 and began to be applied in the following month.9 A continuous run 
of numbers exists, set out in table 1, enabling us to estimate changes in support 
Table 1: Amounts raised by Entertainments Tax, 1916–1939
Tax Year Amount Raised (£)
1916–17 2,917,871
1917–18 4,843,976*
1918–19 7,325,063
1919–20 10,210,360
1920–21 11,504,976
1921–22 10,086,479
1922–23 9,603,047
1923–24 9,284,686
1924–25 6,249,344*
1925–26 5,714,476
1926–27 5,729,054
1927–28 6,119,978
1928–29 6,003,587
1929–30 6,695,847
1930–31 6,952,088
1931–32 7,868,908*
1932–33 9,318,622
1933–34 9,235,160
1934–35 9,724,280
1935–36 7,806,080*
1936–37 7,572,281
1937–38 7,985,071
1938–39 8,153,771
Note: Figures relate to Great Britain only and exclude Northern Ireland. The period 
1916–17 covers may 16, 1916, to march 31, 1917. Figures reflect current prices. 
*Figures are affected by major changes in tax rates, precluding the presentation of the 
series in graph form, which would offer a misleading impression of trends. 
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for the industry across two crucial but less than fully documented decades, 
potentially extending statistical coverage to within seven years of the building 
boom that established cinema as a distinct entertainment form.10
Reaching estimates of audience numbers requires us to follow Rowson’s 
basic method: isolating cinema’s share of the total tax take, identifying the rela-
tionship between the amount paid in duty and the overall price of admission, 
then applying the resultant multiplier to the amount raised in tax at cinemas 
to establish the total sum spent on cinemagoing. Dividing that box-office figure 
by the average ticket price, inclusive of tax, yields the total audience.11 making 
these estimates affords insights into cinema’s place within the overall choice of 
entertainments and the pricing policies adopted by the industry in response to 
changing economic and political circumstances. As will be seen, our calculations 
rest on often incomplete information, impeding any claims for the precision of 
the audience figures that result. Given that they ultimately derive from officially 
gathered statistics, they do however help to define the boundaries of plausibil-
ity, enabling a more realistic appraisal of the development of both industry and 
audience during this formative period, one at times markedly at variance with 
that offered in many existing accounts. Before that can be outlined with any 
conviction, however, challenges posed by changes in each of the variables that 
inform Rowson’s calculations must be confronted. 
ESTIMATING CINEMA’S CONTRIBUTION TO TAX RECEIPTS 
The method of collection adopted for the tax makes identifying the contribu-
tion cinema made to the aggregate returns far from straightforward. When 
first broached in the winter of 1915–16, the tax was envisaged as a stamp duty, 
with the amount payable on top of the basic (exclusive) admission price indi-
cated by means of a stamp affixed to the proprietors’ own tickets, the value 
of the stamp varying with the cost of admission. Alternatively, a government 
ticket could be used, on which was printed the price exclusive of duty and the 
tax payable. Stamps or tickets were purchased in advance from local customs 
offices, the sums expended being redeemed through subsequent admissions.12 
While the local customs and excise offices had information on the number of 
stamps and tickets sold at specific values, the nature of the entertainment for 
which they had been intended remained unknown, a deficiency that would 
persist through the period under review. However, as proposals for the tax 
crystallized in the spring of 1916, the industry pressed for an alternative means 
of collection, minimizing delays caused by the issuing of stamps or tickets to 
large numbers seeking admission immediately before the scheduled start of an 
event. many larger venues already had means of recording admissions, from 
turnstiles to machines that issued metal discs on entrance. The proprietors 
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of such venues made the case that these could provide the basis of returns to 
the tax authorities on admissions at particular prices. Subject to independent 
verification by means of certificates provided by chartered accountants, these 
certified returns became the preferred means of submitting returns by many 
enterprises.13 
The certified returns accounted for a rising proportion of tax receipts 
across the period, increasing from 60 percent of the total take in 1916–17 to 
over 81 percent of the total raised by cinemas alone in 1934, and provide the 
only means of linking the tax revenue to specific forms of entertainment.14 The 
absence of such details for business conducted by stamps and tickets would 
justify successive governments’ refusal to provide information on the contri-
bution of specific amusements to the overall tax take. Even questions raised in 
Parliament, which attempted to confine coverage to the businesses employing 
certified returns, were rebuffed on the grounds that so many businesses used 
the stamp and ticket systems that any breakdown would have no practical 
value.15 Only starting in 1935, when all admissions of 6d., or sixpence, and under 
(each penny representing one twelfth of a shilling and one two hundred and 
fortieth part of a pound), the bulk of which were recorded through stamps and 
tickets, were taken out of tax, was the government prepared to cite the certified 
returns to capture the comparative contributions of the different entertainment 
media.16 
Figures covering a three-month period to the end of November 1935 indi-
cated that 67 percent of the receipts from certified returns were traceable to the 
cinema, compared to 15 percent from other leading indoor entertainments—the 
theater and music hall. The contributions of other forms of amusement making 
up the remainder, predominantly sports, were not specified.17 An instructive 
point of contrast is provided by estimates of amounts raised by certified returns 
collated by the Commissioners of Customs and Excise for the tax year 1920–21, 
which put the shares of cinema and theater/music hall at 36.63 and 46.4 percent, 
respectively.18 Although the magnitude of change is somewhat overstated by a 
further tax change in 1935 that reduced rates on live theatrical entertainments, 
a marked shift in favor of the cinema is still suggested.
To gauge its extent more accurately, the business generated at venues 
using stamps and tickets must be factored in. No breakdown of noncertified 
returns is available at any point in the period starting in 1916–17. The closest 
we have are the figures for entertainments not subject to tax in 1937–38, which 
indicate a 62.6 to 37.4 division between cinematic and noncinematic entertain-
ments.19 These cover seats priced 6d. and below that were exempted from the 
tax starting in 1935, which were more likely than not to have been subject to 
noncertified methods of revenue raising. What is more, the proportion of all 
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entertainments expenditure they represented in 1937–38, 20.6 percent, is close 
to the 18.75 percent that businesses employing stamps and tickets contributed to 
the total raised by cinemas in 1934.20 In the absence of any alternative measure, 
the calculations that follow assumed that noncertified returns were divided 
62.6 to 37.4 in the cinema’s favor through the period starting in 1916. If precision 
cannot be claimed for such an estimate, it has the virtue of acknowledging the 
preponderance of cinema among the cheaper amusements, while apportioning 
a share to other leisure entrepreneurs drawn in to tax during and immediately 
after the First World War. Adding noncertified to certified returns produces a 
weighting for cinema of 47.4 percent of total tax receipts in 1920–21, still consid-
erably below the share of 66.32 percent in 1934.21 A marked shift in the pattern of 
spending on taxable amusements over the intervening years is indicated. 
The question remains at what point this major shift in the balance of the 
certified returns toward the cinema and away from live entertainments occurred. 
Although a sustained and gradual change in cinema’s share of tax receipts start-
ing in the early 1920s cannot be ruled out, it is rendered less likely by the impact 
of technological change toward the end of that decade. Indeed, internal debates 
within the theater trade suggest that any erosion of market share in the years 
before 1929 was rarely ascribed to the cinema. Rather, attention appears to have 
been devoted by representatives of the theatrical trade to the perceived threat 
from cabarets—entertainments offered by restaurants that, because they com-
plemented the principal attraction, the food on offer, were not subject to tax.22 
more often, throughout the 1920s, cinema and theater interests acted in tandem 
in the campaign against the tax waged by the Entertainments Tax Abolition 
league. Unity was maintained, so that the CEA was represented at mass meet-
ings called by the abolition league in advance of the 1929 budget.23 From that 
point, a tendency to see the cinema as the main threat to the theater’s continuing 
viability becomes evident, a viewpoint articulated in September 1930 by Oswald 
Stoll on “The Human Theatre and the mechanical.” Stoll’s argument centered on 
the impact of the talkies, which by offering a product broadly comparable to the 
theater, albeit at the markedly cheaper prices allowed by lower production costs, 
had transformed the market.24 Two branches of the entertainment industry that 
had, to that point, been largely discrete now inhabited similar ground, literally, 
as reports emerged of buildings intended for live entertainment being altered to 
accommodate the talking picture. In may 1930, a mere five weeks after opening, 
the Prince Edward Theatre in Soho was undergoing wiring for sound, while the 
Broadhead group, based in manchester, was reported to be in the process of 
converting four of its theaters to cinemas.25 From this point, the theater pur-
sued its own tax campaign discretely through the Stage and Allied Arts Defence 
league, seeking a lower rate of duty on amusements that primarily depended 
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on the presence of live performers.26 This move to seek protection from the 
encroachments on market share originating with the talkies suggests that the 
shift in expenditure patterns reflected in the changing proportion of tax receipts, 
rather than being consistent across the period beginning in the early 1920s, may 
have occurred substantially in the years of transition from silent to sound film. 
Some sense of the impact this may have had on audience size is conveyed 
by offering two estimates of cinema’s share of overall tax receipts for the period 
from 1929 to 1932: a higher one based on the weighting given to the cinema 
by Stone and Rowe (66.32 percent), and a lower one that carries forward the 
shares observed in the early 1920s. This latter figure was subject to changes 
over the decade. The first followed the abolition of tax on seats priced 6d. and 
below starting in 1924, which had the effect of reducing the industry’s share 
of tax receipts to 36.63 percent.27 The second came at the end of the decade. 
After some years of comparative stability in the tax take, a marked increase 
was recorded in consecutive years 1929–30 and 1930–31, in both of which tax 
rates remained unchanged, of £948,501, or 15.8 percent.28 This was all the more 
notable, coming as it did in a period of mounting economic difficulty. In his 1930 
budget speech, Philip Snowden drew attention to the stark contrast between the 
income from customs and excise duties overall, which fell short of estimates by 
some £3,012,000, and the entertainments tax, which exceeded the anticipated 
yield by over £500,000, a divergence that he believed was traceable primarily 
to “the boom in talking films.”29 For those within the trade, it was manifest 
that sound films had “captured the imagination of the public to a much greater 
extent than was ever anticipated by their sponsors.”30 To reflect the significance 
of sound, our calculations assign all of the growth in tax revenues in the years 
1929–30 and 1930–31 to the cinema. The effect is to raise the cinema’s share of 
the total by the latter year to 45.3 percent.
This still does not account for the seats exempted from tax in 1924 that 
would not come within the scope of official records again until November 1931, 
when the duty was once more extended to admissions priced 6d. and below.31 In 
the absence of precise documentation, the calculations presented here are based 
on the assumption that between 1924 and 1929 nontaxed attendance (which 
according to customs and excise estimates of ticket sales by price accounted 
for just short of 60 percent of cinema admissions32) varied in line with those 
still subject to duty, an approach that business records appear to validate. Small 
halls in mining districts struggled during the prolonged coal stoppage of 1926, 
with roughly one hundred obliged to close for extended periods.33 Thereafter, 
reduced spending power rendered business increasingly precarious. Even away 
from mining areas, there is little evidence of a widespread surge in patronage 
among seats of 6d. and below. In Aberdeen, two halls in the east of the city, the 
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Star and Globe picture houses, which collected only nominal amounts of tax 
after 1924, respectively recorded falling receipts across the later 1920s and 
growth of just short of 10 percent.34 
With the coming of sound, the assumption informing our calculations that 
taxed and nontaxed seats followed the same trend cannot be sustained beyond 
1929. By the end of 1929, only a minority of halls across Britain had undergone 
wiring.35 Western Electric, the largest supplier of sound equipment, claimed just 
over three hundred installations by December of that year, while a survey by the 
CEA indicated that, while most houses intended to re-equip for sound, they had 
yet to begin the process.36 Twelve months later, the trade paper Film Weekly esti-
mated that only six hundred silent cinemas remained, concluding that “the talkie 
revolution in England [sic] is almost complete.”37 Our calculations, therefore, 
assumed that the increase in spending induced by the talkies remained confined 
in 1929–30 to a pioneering minority, so that nontaxed seats were allocated no 
gains from increased expenditure. This overlooks that some seats not subject to 
tax were in cinemas that undertook conversion at an early date. Nevertheless, 
the bulk of the seats exempted from tax in 1924 were in smaller houses where the 
transition was delayed. By 1930–31, the talkies’ ubiquity justified extending the 
rise in expenditure to the nontaxed seats also.
The final stage in estimating cinema’s importance within entertainment 
expenditure across the period involves extending our coverage back to the years 
of the Great War. Considerable uncertainty surrounded the industry’s prospects 
at the outbreak of war in August 1914. Some exhibitors anticipated closure, as 
the supply of film from the United States appeared uncertain, and a combina-
tion of reduced activity and the demands of military recruitment threatened 
to seriously deplete attendance.38 In the end, such fears proved unfounded. In 
some areas, employment on government contracts more than compensated 
for reduced business, while the stationing of troops locally was usually seen as 
a guarantee of full houses.39 yet, even where industrial conditions remained 
unpromising, as across the lancashire cotton districts, business was still 
reported to be buoyant.40 In such cases, the payment of separation allowances 
to dependents provided a guaranteed income to those, primarily women and 
children, who were cinema’s most devoted supporters, ensuring the industry a 
sizeable and loyal constituency.41 An optimistic tone thus permeated the trade 
press, given statistical underpinning by company balance sheets that reported 
profits broadly in line with or even exceeding prewar margins.42 As the first 
anniversary of the outbreak of war approached, the prevailing impression was of 
“Picture Theatres Booming.”43 Indeed, the entertainments tax originated in part 
from the perception that popular expenditure on moving pictures particularly 
remained unchecked by any broader sense of national emergency.44 It therefore 
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seems justifiable to assume that spending on moving pictures was not unduly 
depressed as a consequence of war.
Other indoor amusements also appear to have prospered in this period. 
metropolitan theaters were attracting new audiences of working women and 
servicemen on leave, while trade publications reported that touring companies 
“enjoyed well-won prosperity.”45 Dividend payments used as measures of prof-
itability indicate that most of the larger theatrical undertakings appear at least 
to have maintained prewar rates of return in the years after 1914.46 Here again, 
no significant diminution in theater business was assumed. A more obvious 
casualty of war was sports. Continued competition, which engaged the energies 
of those most suited by gender, age, and fitness for military service, was deemed 
unacceptable, so that many activities were suspended for the duration of the 
conflict.47 Some popular spectator sports were maintained, justifying their con-
tinuance by their contribution to morale, but increasingly operated on a severely 
reduced basis. In England, the Football league suspended national competi-
tion beginning in 1915, instead organizing competitions along regional lines, 
thereby limiting travel needs. league structures endured in Scotland, albeit 
latterly without teams beyond the central belt.48 Overall, regional groupings 
struggled to excite widespread interest, and club accounts charted reduced lev-
els of support. One of the most successful sides in the league’s northern group, 
manchester City, recorded receipts of £5,618 and £5,278 in the seasons 1916–17 
and 1917–18, contributing £824 and £1,127 respectively to the entertainments 
tax take.49 By contrast, in the first full postwar season, the club reported figures 
of £31,364 and £8,649 under each heading.50 Overall, the Football league’s mid-
land section raised £7,153 10s. 1d. in duty over four months ending in January 
1919, compared with the £62,748 raised by the moss’s Empire chain of theaters 
between the introduction of the tax and the end of 1916, a period of just over seven 
months.51 Compared to the postwar period, sport’s contribution to tax receipts 
was marginal. In the absence of direct evidence on the extent of the difference, it 
was assumed that the share of revenue generated by the major spectator sports of 
football, horse racing, and cricket, which customs and excise figures for certified 
returns in the first postwar tax year, 1919–20, put at 6.44 percent, was effectively 
zero for the final two years of the war. With sport eliminated from the mix, the 
tax raised at cinemas was then calculated as a share of the smaller total.52 Once 
allowance is made for cinema’s lower share of certified returns in 1919–20, its 
share of overall tax receipts decreased to 44.75 percent. This had the effect of 
raising cinema’s weighting in the preceding years to 47.8 percent.53 
There remain the amusements rather unhelpfully grouped by customs and 
excise under the general label Other. Some reduction in activity could be antic-
ipated, as many annual events, staples of the local calendar, from agricultural 
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shows to pleasure fairs, were suspended.54 many, however, endured, encouraging 
the agents of the customs and excise offices to pursue contraventions of tax reg-
ulations by a still active population of travelling show people. In 1916, an action 
was brought at Barnstaple Petty Sessions against “Prince Samouda,” described as 
a “well-known coloured entertainer,” charged with defrauding the Exchequer of 
0.5d. tax per ticket.55 Other cases turned on the problems itinerant entertainers 
faced in acquiring stamps or government tickets.56 If the Other category of enter-
tainments experienced shrinkage during wartime, the extent of decline cannot 
be documented with confidence, so that any attempt to assign a lower weighting 
to this group would be arbitrary. The calculations outlined here assumed that the 
Other category was unaffected by wartime conditions. If this overstates activity 
in this sector, it compensates in some degree for any underrecording of sport in 
wartime. 
Table 2 summarizes the various estimates offered above, showing the 
proportions of the total tax take ascribed to the cinema over the period 1916 
to 1935.
Table 2: Cinema’s share of taxable expenditure on entertainments, 1916–1935
Tax Year Share (%)
From To
1916–17 1918–19 47.8
1919–20 44.75
1920–21 1923–24 47.34
1924–25 1928–29 36.63
Lower Higher
1929–30 43.18 66.32
1930–31 45.27 66.32
1931–32 (seven months) 45.27 66.32
1931–32 ( five months) 1934–35 66.32
TAX RATES AND THE AVERAGE PRICE OF ADMISSION 
The next stage in the calculations involved estimating the weight of the tax in 
the inclusive price of admission. For 1934, Rowson found that the tax accounted 
for an average of 16.67 percent of the ticket price, reflecting Snowden’s intention, 
outlined in his September 1931 budget, that the tax bear as far as was practicable 
a uniform weight across the price range of one-sixth of the admission charge.57 
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In terms of price, Rowson calculated the average at 10.26d., a figure later adjusted 
upward to 10.33d.58 Points of comparison elsewhere within the period are pro-
vided by analyses of ticket sales by customs and excise officials in 1916–17 and 
1923–24. The first presents an annualized estimate from ticket sales over the 
quarter from October to December 1916. The coverage was incomplete, with only 
admissions registered via sales of government tickets and stamps categorized by 
price. Certified returns, by contrast, yielded only aggregate data, obliging officials 
to assume that the distribution of ticket sales in this category by price mirrored 
those for noncertified receipts. While some distortion was acknowledged, its 
effect was judged marginal. Combined, the certified stamp and government 
ticket returns provide total admissions and the total tax take at each price level. 
From this, it is possible to calculate aggregate box-office receipts at each price 
([tax + admission price] x ticket sales). If attention is confined to those seats 
that cost 1s. and under, some approximation to the position in cinemas may be 
obtained, as this price range was judged by customs and excise to encompass all 
but the most expensive West End picture palaces. For these admissions, the tax 
was found to make up on average 18.7 percent of the inclusive price (tax receipts / 
box-office receipts), while dividing the box-office receipts by the number of tick-
ets sold produced an average price of 4.8d.59 Responding to what was judged 
a disappointing yield for the year, the 1917 budget raised the overall weight of 
the duty. Utilizing the 1916–17 distribution of admissions by price suggests that 
the increase, which applied starting in October, raised the tax to 23.3 percent 
of the inclusive price, and the average price to just over 5d.60
Amendments allowing exhibitors to retain a greater proportion of the 
inclusive price at 3d. (from August 1918) and 6d. (October 1919) reduced the over-
all weight of the tax, so that by the time of the second ticket survey, early in 
1924, it was found to account for 20.7 percent of inclusive prices. By then, the 
average inclusive charge calculated across a range of seat prices equivalent to 
that employed by Rowson in 1934 stood at 9.67d., a marked increase on the figure 
for 1918.61 During the war, trade papers had argued for the necessity of raising 
admission charges to address the problem of mounting costs, primarily for film 
hire and wages, and to enable the industry to shed any reputation for offering 
entertainment that in all senses of the word could be deemed cheap.62 If the onset 
of the tax in 1916 delayed any adjustment, by 1918, buoyed by the conviction that 
increases enforced by taxation had not deterred patrons, exhibitors finally moved 
to raise prices. Reports that cinemas in Glasgow and Aberdeen had taken the lead 
in implementing change impressed the chancellor, Bonar law, who invoked local 
knowledge to observe to a CEA deputation in may 1918, “Well now, if Aberdeen is 
prepared to pay extra, there is no part of the kingdom, in my opinion, that is not 
prepared to pay.”63 In the months on either side of the armistice, the trade press 
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recorded widespread movement on prices, so that by August 1919, exhibitors in 
Bonar law’s bellwether city of Aberdeen had agreed to a doubling of minimum 
prices to 4d.64 In individual instances, the increase in charges was marked, so 
that by 1920 at one hall in North Shields, the cost of admission to various parts of 
the house had risen by between 25 and 80 percent, while at the town hall in the 
Scottish burgh of Kirkintilloch, the business run by the local council raised prices 
over three years by between 50 and 100 percent.65 The most substantial change 
in the cost of cinemagoing in the period before the Second World War had been 
effected, so that by 1920–21, average prices exceeded 10d. In practice, however, 
moves to coordinate price adjustments often failed to secure unanimous support, 
justifying the treasury’s assessment in 1918 that “the Cinema trade is notoriously 
not organized.”66 With changes decided largely on a local and piecemeal basis, our 
ability to precisely capture the extent of price increases in the years 1918–19 and 
1919–20 was compromised. To address this, two calculations were attempted: the 
first assumed that price increases were spread evenly over the three years starting 
in 1917–18, the second allowed for an accelerated rate of increase, divided equally 
over the two years to 1919–20 (see table 3). 
Table 3: Hypothetical price adjustments and their impact on attendance
Three-stage price increase, 1918–19 to 1920–21
Year Average Price Audience
1916–17 4.82d. 373 million
1917–18 4.96d. 540 million
1918–19 6.81d. 596 million
1919–20 8.66d. 612 million
1920–21 10.5d. 601 million
Two-stage price increase, 1918–19 to 1919–20
Year Average Price Audience
1916–17 4.82d. 373 million
1917–18 4.96d. 540 million
1918–19 7.73d. 525 million
1919–20 10.5d. 504 million
1920–21 10.5d. 601 million
The two-stage price increase generated falling attendance after 1918, 
at odds with the prevailing sense of prosperity across the trade. A three-stage 
increase would seem to offer a more realistic picture of trends across these years 
and was the estimate adopted for the final series presented in table 5. 
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Table 4: Proportion of ticket sales by price, 1916–34 (%)
Inclusive Price 1916–17 1924 1934
To 2.5d. 32.08 10.55 5.32
2.5d. to 5d. 36.9 19.66 8.49
5d. to 7d. 22.15 5.7 18.38
7d. to 11d. 2.47 32.56 37.15
11d. to 1s. 2d. 3.85 10.45 15.05
1s. 2d. to 1s. 5d. 0.3 0.57 0
1s. 5d. to 1s. 8d. 0.79 1.67 0.42
1s. 8d. to 2s. 2d. 0.49 3.99 2.64
2s. 2d. to 2s. 8d. 0.43 0.76 1.81
above 2s. 8d. 0.55 0.76 0.68
By contrast, the shift to new technology generated no comparable 
adjustment. Indeed, debate within the trade press at the time focused more 
on the prospect of price reductions than on any organized move to increase 
charges. The problem of low prices appeared especially acute in heavy indus-
trial districts, so that in march 1930, a survey across the city of Sheffield found 
that in thirty-one out of forty houses, seats were available for below 6d. each.67 
Price increases were discouraged by the squeeze on spending power at a time 
of rising unemployment and the competition from nontaxed entertainments, 
such as the dance hall.68 Pressures within the trade also intensified as new 
talkie houses opened, precluding unity on prices. In August 1929, the Albion 
Cinema in North Shields adjusted admission charges, taking them close to 
the level operative at the industry’s postwar peak in the early 1920s. yet this 
proved difficult to maintain when another talkie hall opened in 1930.69 The 
reimposition of the tax on seats priced 6d. and below late in 1931 faced exhib-
itors with a choice, whether or not to pass the tax on to patrons in increased 
prices. With adherence to any collective line increasingly unlikely, many opted 
to hold charges steady, effectively paying the tax themselves, at a time when 
the anticipated price elasticity of demand was high.70 The finding that prices 
remained broadly stable has further implications for the rise in entertain-
ments tax revenue after 1929, suggesting that it was primarily a consequence 
of growth in business. 
A comparison of pricing structures across time suggests that the most 
significant changes centered on the early postwar years (see table 4). 
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Table 5: Cinema admissions, 1916–34, indicated by entertainments tax returns
Year Cinema Share (%) Multiplier Avg. Price (d.) Admissions
1916–17 47.8 5.35 4.82 373 million
1917–18 47.8 4.82 4.96 540 million
1918–19 47.8 4.82 6.8 596 million
191920 44.75 4.83 8.7 612 million
1920–21 47.34 4.83 10.5 601 million
1921–22 47.34 4.83 10.11 547 million
1922–23 47.34 4.83 9.76 540 million
1923–24 47.34 4.83 9.67 527 million
1924–25 36.63 6.41 13.2* 586 million
1925–26 36.63 6.41 13.48 581 million
1926–27 36.63 6.41 13.86 567 million
1927–28 36.63 6.41 14.11 595 million
1928–29 36.63 6.41 13.86 594 million
1929–30 
(low)
43.18 6.41 13.61 677 million
1929–30 
(high)
66.32 6.41 13.61 852 million
1930–31 
(low)
45.27 6.41 13.36 763 million
1930–31 
(high)
66.23 6.41 13.36 932 million
1931–32 66.32 6.24 12.21 887 million
1932–33 66.32 6 10.6 840 million
1933–34 66.32 6 10.4 848 million
1934–35 66.32 6 10.3 902 million
Note: figures for 1916–17 are for may 16, 1916, to march 31, 1917. *The higher average 
price results from the lifting of the tax on cheaper seats (6d. and below) in the 1924 
budget.
It will be noted that the figures for average prices set out in table 5 are 
not static but move in proportion to the average price estimated for entertain-
ments as a whole by Stone and Rowe.71 This reflects the tendency for the aver-
age to drift upward or downward as patrons opted for higher or lower priced 
seating. Between 1925 and 1927, the average price charged by the Provincial 
Cinematograph Theatres ltd. rose from 11.75d. to 1s. 0.25d., without any formal 
adjustment to exclusive rates.72
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THE CINEMA AUDIENCE, 1916–1934 
The remainder of this paper explores the interpretive framework suggested by 
the figures presented in table 5. By these estimates, it is clear that at no stage 
before the outbreak of the Second World War did the annual cinema audience 
match the estimate of one billion admissions, first advanced by Spoor, and that 
if anything the figure of over 900 million in 1934, which Rowson considered 
below expectations, may have represented a high point to that date in popular 
engagement with the moving image.73 That figure followed a surge in spending 
on entertainment and a coincident shift in patronage toward the cinema as 
film included speaking for the first time. That it may have been matched or 
even exceeded some twenty years earlier seems, in the light of the compelling 
evidence provided by the tax data, barely credible. Indeed, customs and excise’s 
own estimates suggest that admissions to all taxable entertainments during 
the financial year 1916–17 did not exceed 870 million, with cinema attendance 
barely exceeding 8 million a week.74 
That said, there are grounds for thinking that the returns from 1916–17 
were unusually low, as they fell short of what some considered a modest esti-
mate by government of a likely tax yield of £5 million, coming in instead at £3.3 
million for the full financial year.75 For many, the problem was traceable to the 
duty itself. Within weeks of its introduction, the tax was being blamed for a 
marked downturn in business beyond that normally expected in the summer 
months. By the end of July 1916, an editorial in The Bioscope was clear that “the 
factor which has definitely tilted the scale from profit to loss is the Amusement 
Tax.”76 Widespread closures, involving an estimated thousand houses across the 
country, were adduced in support of such claims.77 yet other factors were seen 
to have exacerbated the tax’s impact. Its introduction coincided with the onset 
of the trade’s slack summer period, when many houses deemed it less costly to 
close than to continue operations, and these inflated the reported casualty fig-
ures from the tax.78 Anticipated seasonal variations were further intensified by 
a period of unusually good weather and the introduction of daylight saving time, 
which, by allowing an extra hour’s daylight each evening, advantaged outdoor 
activities. In identifying the challenges confronting the trade, many gave greater 
weight to British summer time than to any increase in the cost of admission.79 
Nevertheless, as seemingly the most remediable of difficulties, the tax remained 
the principal cause for complaint within the industry.
The government’s response to the lower than anticipated returns was to 
raise rates on most ticket prices. The impact of any increase in prices was to a 
degree moderated by delaying their introduction until October 1917, a point in 
the year when the return to Greenwich mean time and darker nights held out 
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the promise of greater business.80 Nevertheless, a survey by The Era newspaper 
of over nine hundred places of entertainment found that the expected autumn 
uplift had not occurred and that receipts over the first four weeks of the new 
rates were down by over 20 percent.81 When put before treasury officials, how-
ever, such results were deemed transitory and unrepresentative. Instead, the 
observations of local tax officials, the comments of the trade press, and trends 
in certified returns from industrial centers across the country painted an alto-
gether more optimistic picture.82 Assisted in part by the effects of more efficient 
administration, as local police were deployed to provide regular inspections of 
places of entertainment, yields were boosted by unmistakable indications in 
the spring of 1918 that “the entertaining business [was] on a high wave of pros-
perity.”83 Returns in January 1918 for twenty-five towns showed annual growth 
in box-office receipts exclusive of tax of between 1 and 79 percent. In sixteen 
towns, the increase was in excess of 20 percent.84 The final tax returns suggest 
this increase was not untypical. Adjusting the figure for 1916–17 to reflect the 
take across a full financial year and allowing for growth in receipts arising from 
the imposition of higher rates, estimated by customs and excise at £500,000 for 
the six months starting in October 1917, the yield for 1917–18 exceeded expec-
tations by some 21 percent.85 In the absence of any concerted move to raise 
exclusive prices, such figures point to a marked upswing in patronage. Although 
the extent of the increase is suggestive of a rebound from depressed activity in 
1916–17, indications are that by the final year of the war, the cinema audience 
had reached new heights.86
Trading success continued into the immediate postwar period, with 
company balance sheets offering the clearest indications of enduring prosper-
ity. For Provincial Cinematograph Theatres, trading profits reached £224, 913 
in the twelve months to the end of January 1921.87 At the same time, share-
holders benefited from enhanced dividend payments. In Scotland, the newly 
reconstituted BB Pictures (1920) ltd. paid 25 percent in the twelve months 
to the end of October 1920, while further north the Aberdeen Picture Palaces 
ltd. made disbursements equivalent to a 90 percent dividend that same year.88 
Such returns gave material substance to the description of cinemas by one 
candidate for municipal honors in Dundee as “veritable Klondykes.”89 yet the 
precise nature of this boom merits closer examination. The boost to receipt, 
which saw the income of the Albion Cinema, North Shields, rise by 66 percent 
between 1918 and 1921, appeared more the result of higher charges at the box 
office than a surge in patronage.90 Overall, while prices more than doubled over 
the three years starting in 1917–18, the audience, by the most plausible mea-
sure, increased over the same period by upward of 13 percent. The suggestion 
that the first significant upward revision in prices had not induced any fall in 
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admissions is, however, telling. While reflective of higher levels of disposable 
income, as wages more than kept pace with price inflation following the armi-
stice, the figures also capture the deep attachment cinemagoers now felt for 
their favored mode of entertainment, which an enhanced cost of attendance 
did nothing to weaken. Figures within the trade had frequently asserted the 
growing importance of the picture house in national life: “As a means of relief 
from the strain and stress with which the whole population is now suffering, . . . , 
as an antidote to unrest . . . , and as an educational factor its usefulness is being 
more and more realised and utilised everyday.”91 The tax returns gave such 
claims substance: for large parts of the population, the cinema had become an 
indispensable part of their lives.
For all that, cinemagoing remained vulnerable to any prolonged squeeze 
on discretionary spending. Recession in the early 1920s hit hardest in cinema’s 
urban, industrial heartland, so that over the three years beginning in 1923–24, 
receipts at the Albion Cinema fell by over 30 percent and by almost half at the 
Dunfermline Cinema House.92 The aggregated figures suggest a more modest 
fall in attendances overall of just over 16 percent, still sufficient to wipe out post-
war gains and the first sustained fall in support experienced by the industry. 
The campaign against the tax, muted during the Klondyke years, was resumed 
starting in 1921, culminating in Snowden’s reform in favor of the cheaper seats 
in 1924. From that point on, recovery, slow and uneven, set in, its limited extent 
indicated by the fact that by cinema’s last fully silent year, admissions had still 
to regain their postwar peak.93 
Any marked discontinuity in attendance levels awaited technological 
change. Contemporary comments communicate an awareness of underlying 
trends. Within a year of the first talkie being shown, Kinematograph Weekly 
noted that sound had generated a new audience for the moving picture, with the 
promise of further growth to come: it was “the harvest ready to be gathered.”94 
By late 1930, an increase in patronage of some 25 percent was being claimed.95 
Rowson, having cited a weekly attendance of 20 million in 1927, now placed the 
number of cinemagoers at 25 to 30 million a week.96 His observations were taken 
up by the Exhibitors’ Association which, in its attempt to press the case against 
the tax, claimed a peak annual attendance, prior to the extension of the duty 
following the September 1931 budget, of some 1.3 billion.97 If the tax returns 
suggest that this represents a considerable overstatement of audience size at 
this point, they broadly endorse the argument for a substantial increase in the 
cinemagoing population starting in 1929. Taken in isolation, the boost to tax 
receipts over the two years beginning in march 1929 was capable of generating 
a rise in admissions of some 28.5 percent. When the transfer of patronage from 
the theater to the cinema is factored in, this had the potential to produce an 
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audience in excess of 930 million by 1930–31.98 This assumes that the process 
of substituting what Stoll referred to as mechanical for live performance was 
completed by this date, an improbably rapid transition, and so this figure should 
be regarded as representing the highest extent of any possible gains during the 
first years of sound.
This observation colors our interpretation of the impact of the down-
turn in business, which contemporary comments and tax data agree set in 
around 1931. Exhibitors, while acknowledging the trade’s relative immunity 
from the immediate effects of recession, pointed to increasing difficulty, espe-
cially beginning in the autumn of that year. This was traced to the tighter fiscal 
regime imposed following the financial crisis of late summer, which resulted 
in cuts in public sector pay and, crucially for much afternoon business, state 
benefits such as the dole.99 Reductions in spending power, coincident with an 
increase in tax, worked, it was argued, to depress receipts and admissions. 
Returns from individual districts charted dramatic falls in business, so that 
early in 1932, receipts were reported to be down by between 25 and 45 per-
cent, while the slump in attendance was said to have reached 44 percent in 
some halls in working-class districts.100 When aggregated, any fall, while still 
marked, appeared less dramatic. The CEA reported audiences 13 percent down 
in the early months of 1932.101 yet credence should not be given readily to such 
figures, often based on returns furnished by a small minority of exhibitors.102 
Not for the first time, the association’s claims were open to challenge on the 
grounds that they failed to represent the overall picture accurately. The tax 
returns provide further cause to doubt. The CEA estimated that the fall in 
business throughout the winter of 1931–32 had reduced admissions to the 
equivalent of 1.14 billion a year (down 15 percent from the peak).103 yet such 
an attendance would, applying the figures for average seat prices and the tax’s 
share of inclusive prices for that year, have required that the cinema generate 
90 percent of total receipts from the entertainments tax, compared to the 66.32 
percent share observed in 1934.
The figures presented here outline more modest losses, amounting to 
just short of 10 percent from the peak of 1930–31 to the low point of 1932–33. 
Even this rests on acceptance of a figure that may by some margin overstate 
the audience for 1930–31, so that the impact of the downturn may have been 
more limited than these figures suggest.104 What seems clear, however, is that 
the slump faced by exhibitors was less severe and less sustained than that of 
the early 1920s. Various explanations may be offered for this contrast. Cinema’s 
gains at the expense of the theater may have worked to offset any falloff among 
more established patrons. A broader social base, in particular a larger sub-
urban audience, offered greater security against the effects of any economic 
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downturn. What is more, it appears that beginning in 1931 exhibitors attempted 
to minimize the impact of the tax increase. Rather than passing it on, adding 
to the cost of admission, as had been the norm in the inflationary teens, a 
period also when the price elasticity of demand was observed to be lower, a 
sizeable minority of businesses, some two thousand by one estimate, declined 
to raise seat prices.105 Even Neville Chamberlain, in his 1935 budget speech, 
acknowledged that Snowden’s aim of making cinemagoers pay the increased 
tax, thus ensuring that all contributed to addressing the financial crisis, had 
not been achieved in practice.106 Businesses thus sacrificed box-office income, 
ensuring in the process that any fall in admissions in the early 1930s was both 
shallow and brief. With prices static or falling across the 1930s, recovery in 
company balance sheets proved more protracted, and it would take the boost 
to cinemagoing during the Second World War to restore the exhibition sector 
to the kind of consistently profitable state it had last enjoyed in the late silent 
era.107  
CONCLUSION 
In concluding, we are obliged, rather like the cinemagoer emerging from a 
darkened auditorium into daylight outside, to adjust to wider realities. Our 
preoccupation here has been with a range of activities, public entertainments, 
which in 1938 accounted for only 1.5 percent of total consumer expenditure. In 
aggregate terms, growth in this category of spending appeared modest, with 
amounts expended, as measured in current prices, up 4.1 percent starting in 
1920 and an audience that was 17 percent larger by the end of the period.108 
yet, as the discussion above has attempted to establish, such figures conceal 
important underlying changes, both quantitative and qualitative, in the mar-
ket for mass amusements as a whole and the cinema in particular. Debate 
surrounding the entertainments tax helps to clarify both developments. In 
1916, the tax was contemplated as a levy on cinemagoing, its value residing in 
its ability to tap spending by a public which, because of age and gender, made 
a limited contribution to government revenues. In part, such thinking helped 
to justify the markedly regressive nature of the tax as originally drafted, with 
higher rates imposed on the cheaper seats (33.3 percent on seats priced 1d. and 
3d. in 1916–17).109 By the 1930s, however, the proportion of the inclusive price 
that went to the tax was more uniform across a range of prices (3d. seats bore 
a tax of 16.7 percent, compared to a peak rate of 21 percent), and drew on the 
spending power of a wider public. Any distinction between those who did and 
did not attend the pictures had become less clear by the mid-1930s so that by the 
final prewar years, cinemagoing could with justification be seen as “the essential 
social habit of the age.”110
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yet for many this was also a recently acquired habit, a point which analysis 
of the entertainments tax helps to clarify. In tracing trends in audience levels, 
the tax proves a sure-footed if not fully comprehensive guide. In particular, it 
provides solid justification for rejecting estimates advanced by contemporaries 
and cited with varying degrees of conviction in later literature, whose acceptance 
rests more on the frequency with which they have been reiterated than on their 
grounding in fact. As outlined here, the tax returns generate numbers that are 
markedly lower than those which have been advanced previously. For all that, 
they also indicate that the first phase of cinema’s growth as a discrete medium 
of mass entertainment, before and during World War I, produced a distinct and 
loyal picture-going public, one which would not be deterred from following its 
favored recreational pursuit even when the cost of so doing rose markedly. Tax 
returns also identify the coming of sound as the major discontinuity in the period 
from 1916 to 1934. There was a tendency among contemporaries to question the 
impact of technological change, pointing to aesthetic limitations in the end prod-
uct and the indifference of individual picture-goers.111 From this it would hardly 
be anticipated that the audience for talking films would be any larger than that 
for their silent counterparts. yet the tax figures suggest that such was emphati-
cally the case, to the extent that the coming of sound may almost be regarded as a 
second rebirth for cinema, resulting in an identifiably different product appealing 
to a substantially new audience, one which Rowson would enumerate, even if he 
did not recognize it as such, beginning in 1934.112
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